THE SAGA OF THE MERCENARY SOLDIER PART II

Mercenaries are in the headlines again, this week in the madness and insanity that is Qaddafi's Libya. My initial thoughts when I first saw this was that the North African Nutjob had a cadre of Eastern European professional soldiers as a sort of Varangian Guard, but as it turns out Qaddafi's personal foreign legion are basically a pack of thugs from Zimbabwe:

Tooling around in Tobruk, looking for some ass to kick.

Suspected African mercenaries stand in a room in a court in Benghazi as they are held by anti-Qaddafi protesters, February 24, 2011


If these guys are anything like any and every African soldier I ever trained, worked with or encountered on the battlefield; they've all got malaria, half of them can't read or write, and their only understanding of the Law of Land Warfare is that they're breaking every law in the book. No matter how hard you train them, in contact they revert to the "spray-and-pray" school of gunfighting and the safest place to be when they're shooting at you is right out in the middle of the street because they can't hit the broad side of a barn from the inside.

A dead Zimbabwean, formerly in the hire of Muammar Qaddafi


These are heathen savages, capable of the most horrific atrocities. To call them barbarians is an insult to all barbarians everywhere and the only thing professional about Qaddafi's mercenaries is the fact that they've been doing what they're doing for a prerequisite period of time. Their knowledge of tactics or gunnery starts at the buttstock of their Kalishnikov and ends at the business end.

Amongst Africans, the term "mercenaries" has mystic, almost supernatural connotations.


Despite the public's fascination with the subject, there's a lot of misunderstanding about the term "mercenary". Most people consider a mercenary to be a soldier that serves merely for wages. According to this broad definition, practically every member of every standing, professional army in the world is a mercenary - and I've actually heard American soldiers referred to in this vein.

A more selective definition is found in Webster’s Dictionary: "a mercenary is a soldier hired into foreign service serving merely for pay or sordid advantage." According to this criteria, every foreign national serving in the U.S. military - including yours truly - is a mercenary.

According to the definitions found within the Hague and Geneva Conventions; a mercenary is a professional soldier hired by a foreign army, as opposed to a soldier enlisted in the armed forces of the sovereign state of which he is a citizen, and is "motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the Armed Forces of that Party" (Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention of August 1949).

Non-conscript professional members of a regular army are not considered mercenaries even though they get remuneration for their service. Under this definition, even members of the French Foreign Legion and the Gurkha Regiment are technically not mercenaries under the Laws of Land Warfare, even though they meet many of the requirements of Article 47 of the 1949 Additional Protocol I; they are exempt under clauses 47(a)(c)(d)(e)&(f). Journalists tend to describe these soldiers as mercenaries regardless.

There ARE mercenaries out there; I have known a few. Adventurers, guns-for-hire, some of them I even consider professional counterparts, but more often than not their activities are of questionable legal or ethical nature. I myself have been called a mercenary but this is a stretch; I retired honorably from the military, and I work in the security profession. I am certainly not a criminal, and there are some things that I simply will not do for pay.

The notorious Thahan Phran (ทหารพราน; literally "Hunter Soldiers") - an irregular light infantry force which patrols the borders of Thailand - are considered mercenaries, although they are technically part of the Royal Thai Army, and they certainly are not foreigners.

Thai Tahan Prahn soldier on security perimeter.


The private security contractors in the hire of the U.S. Department of Defense or State Department are not mercenaries; they are technically no different than the private security manning the gates at U.S. government facilities throughout the United States - they not mercenaries anymore so than postal inspectors are Federal Law Enforcement.


On the other hand, Qaddafi's goons ARE mercenaries, although I consider them professionals only in that they serve for pay. And in light of the way these brigands are conducting themselves, they are not soldiers any more than the Khmer Rouge or Hitler's SS were; "uniformed organized crime" is how I refer to this kind of scum.


. . . . . . . . . . . . . SEAN LINNANE SENDS


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NOT QUITE GANDHI . . .

GAZA PEACE ACTIVIST BOASTS HE COULD HAVE "TAKEN OUT" 3 IDF COMMANDOs


Some direct quotes from:
The weblog of Ken O’Keefe


A beautiful gift from the BBC

If you haven’t seen it, look for BBC Panorama’s “Death in the Med” program online, you will be treated to first class propaganda as only the BBC can deliver.

I am one of the passengers/witnesses interviewed for this program . . .

. . . I solicited an agreement with the BBC producers, in return for my interview the program would include the fact that we disarmed, captured and ultimately released three Israeli commandos (after giving them medical attention no less). That was the deal, a deal I made with an audio recorder in service.

And yes the poor Israeli commandos were beaten, just as any invader in any capable persons home would be beaten. I take no issue with that fact.

But truth be told, the commandos we captured should thank us for their lives. I ask the Israeli’s, British and American people specifically, if your home was invaded, your family being murdered, would you be willing to disarm, completely control, and then set a murderer of your family free???


STORMBRINGER: OKAY there Hero, we let you have your say; now here's the professional anaylsis:

Close-Up Footage of Mavi Marmara Passengers Attacking IDF Soldiers




Those Israeli commandos showed INCREDIBLE RESTRAINT, when in fact they had every right to use deadly force; every rule in the Law of Land Warfare allows a soldier to defend himself. Consider: these soldiers were following legal orders, enforcing a legal naval blockade designed to prevent the import of weapons via maritime means into Gaza - weapons intended for use in terror attacks against Israeli civilians.

In the course of their duties, the Israeli soldiers were set upon with stun grenades, chains and iron bars. In one of the clips we see an Israeli soldier being thrown overboard - weighed down with full combat kit, this is a potential death sentence.

To be swarmed by an armed mob like that, in confined space, my instincts would have been to open fire, take as many of them with me as possible. Some Israeli soldiers said they used their pistols only after activists struck one of their comrades. Activists on board said the IDF opened fire on the ship before boarding.

Espen Goffeng, an activist from Norway, said Israeli soldiers started with paintball rounds, then switched to rubber bullets and then afterwards used live ammunition. This kind of escalation of force is acceptable within normal Rule of Engagement. Again; the Law of Land Warfare does not preclude a combatant from using deadly force in self-defence.

Nine activists were shot and killed, many at close range, and dozens were injured. Again, the IDF showed incredible restraint. Any of the so-called "peace protestors" who survived the situation, should consider themselves very fortunate - THEY ARE LUCKY TO BE ALIVE.

Seven Israeli commandos were injured. The wounded activists were evacuated by Israeli air force helicopters for treatment in Israeli hospitals and medical facilities of the Israeli Prisons Service.


Mavi Marmara Passengers Attack IDF Before Soldiers Board Ship




These so-called "peace activists" were looking for a fight:

Weapons Found on the Flotilla Ship Mavi Marmara Used by Activists Against IDF Soldiers:




Over the past 10 years there have been many attempts to smuggle weapons to terrorist organizations by sea. These attempts highlight the cooperation between Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas in their goal to undermine the State of Israel and target its civilians.

Source: Talia Wissner-Levy, IDF News Media


May 7th, 2001: Santorini

The Santorini was intercepted on its way from Lebanon to the Gaza Strip. It contained a large shipment of 40 tons of weapons including Strela anti-aircraft missiles—the same kind that terrorists fired at and narrowly missed an Arkia Israeli passenger jet taking off from Mombassa, Kenya in November 2002. The shipment also included mortars, rifles and guns, grenades, mines and explosive material, anti-tank RPG-7 missile-launchers, and artillery rockets.

Three crew members aboard the Santorini were convicted for trying to smuggle weapons from Lebanon to the Gaza Strip — the captain, a professional weapons smuggler and two of his relatives aboard the ships, had been involved in three previous smuggling attempts backed by Hezbollah and PFLP-GC.

The Santorini was acquired by PFLP-GC in a small island off Syria, and registered as Syrian. During previous smuggling attempts by the crew, arms were packed in Syria and transferred to Lebanon by a Syrian bus. Part of the anti-tank weaponry originated from Iran.


January 3rd, 2002: Karin-A

Karin-A was intercepted in the Red Sea along the Iranian coast, heading towards the Palestinian Authority. It carried 80 submergible containers of 50 tons of weapons, including: RPG-7 rockets, RPG-18 anti-tank rocket launchers, Iranian-made anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, 2200 kilograms of high explosive demolition blocks, Sagger anti-tank launchers and missiles, as well as rifles, machine guns, AK-47s, 735 hand grenades, 700,000 rounds of small ammunition, and diving equipment. The submergible containers were to be dropped into the sea and then washed ashore the Gaza Strip or picked up by a smaller vessel and delivered to the Strip.

Yasser Arafat's former CFO and confidante at the time, Fuad Shubaki was heavily involved in the smuggling attempt, the crew included members of the P.A. and Arafat eventually admitted P.A. involvement in the smuggling attempt. The ship was purchased in Lebanon and sailed to Sudan and Yemen to pick up civilian goods (watermelon seeds, sesame seeds, rice, toys, clothes) to disguise the weapons aboard.

June 8th, 2002

Two Palestinians were found swimming along the north Gaza Strip shore armed with four grenades, an AK-47, and four ammunition magazines in an attempt to infiltrate an Israeli community.


August 4th, 2002

IDF naval forces identified an armed Palestinian wearing a oxygenated scuba diving suit and carrying an AK-47, 8 grenades, 4 ammunition magazines, who was on his way towards an Israeli community from the Gaza coast.


November 23rd, 2002

After many attempts to communicate with an unknown Palestinian fishing boat heading from the Gaza Strip towards the direction of Israel, the bomb-laden boat exploded near an Israeli security patrol boat, moderately injuring three and lightly injuring one.


January 7th, 2003

A suspicious life raft found floating along the northern Gaza Strip coast was found to be booby-trapped with explosives.


May 21st, 2003 Abu Hasan

The Abu Hasam was intercepted in waters west of Haifa, sailing from Lebanon to Egypt carrying Hezbollah explosives bound for the Gaza Strip. The boat itself was a fishing boat, no doubt used purposefully to disguise its intentions. Cargo contained: a radio-activation system to detonate bombs remotely, CDs of directives on how to carry out suicide bomb terror attacks, five boxes with rocket fuses, and 25 Katyusha rocket detonators. The masterminds of the arms smuggling attempt were connected to Arafat's P.A. and Hezbollah.


October 12th, 2009 Hansa India

The Hansa India, which sailed from Iran flying a German flag was due to unload a cargo of eight containers in Egypt. Following warnings from the German authorities, the vessel was not unloaded and continued to Malta where it was seized and found to be carrying bullets and industrial material intended for the production of weapons, seemingly bound for Syria.


November 3th, 2009 Francop

The Francop, a German vessel, was intercepted off the coast of Cyprus en route from Iran to Syria where it would be smuggled by land to Hezbullah in Lebanon. The ship contained 36 containers with 500 tons of arms: 9,000 mortar bombs, 3,000 Katyusha rockets, 3,000 gun shells, 20,000 grenades and half of a million rounds of small ammunition, all hidden behind sacks of polyethelene. The arms smuggling was attempted without the knowledge of the crew: the cache was loaded from the Bandar Port in Iran on an Iranian vesel and stopped at an Egyptian port, where the cache was unloaded onto the Francop. The cache was ten times larger than the cache seized from the Karin A.


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THE SAGA OF THE MERCENARY SOLDIER, Part I

My intent was to write a brief history of mercenaries throughout the ages. The story of the World's Second Oldest Profession is anything BUT brief, however, and as I researched it the project grew; large and exhaustive. Despite my inside knowledge of the trade, I was still surprised by what I learned.

I tried to organize the information I gained in chronological order, but this is difficult. It seems the role of the private soldier has had far-reaching effects from the Dawn of History into our modern civilization. When you think about it, this only makes sense; War is the punctuation of History.

What follows is Part I; an overview of what a Mercenary is, as defined by the International Law of Land Warfare, and the United State Uniformed Code of Military Justice.

- Sean Linnane, January 2010



Modern mercenary sniper, Siege of Sarajevo, circa 1993

From Webster’s: mer•ce•nary, noun, plural mer•ce•nar•ies: one that serves merely for wages; especially : a soldier hired into foreign service adjective: Function: adjective 1 : serving merely for pay or sordid advantage : venal; also : greedy, 2 : : hired for service in the army of a foreign country, 3: having or marked by an eager and often selfish desire especially for material possessions "a mercenary urge to own the latest and most expensive item in home electronics" Etymology: Middle English, 14th century, from the Latin mercenarius, irregular from merced-, merces wages






A mercenary is a professional soldier hired by a foreign army, as opposed to a soldier enlisted in the armed forces of the sovereign state of which he is a citizen. He takes part in armed conflict on many different scales, and is "motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the Armed Forces of that Party" (Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention of August 1949). A non-conscript professional member of a regular army is not considered to be a mercenary although he gets remuneration for his service.

As a result of the assumption that a mercenary is essentially motivated by money, the term "mercenary" usually carries negative connotations, though that can be a compliment in some contexts. There is a blur in the distinction between a "mercenary" and a "foreign volunteer", when the primary motive of a soldier in a foreign army is uncertain.




French Foreign Legionnaire, Bosnia circa 1995


For instance, the French Foreign Legion and the Gurkhas are not mercenaries under the laws of war, since although they may meet many of the requirements of Article 47 of the 1949 Additional Protocol I, they are exempt under clauses 47(a)(c)(d)(e)&(f); some journalists describe them as mercenaries regardless.



Nepali Gurkha soldiers in the service of the British Army


The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 provides the most widely accepted international definition of a mercenary, though not endorsed by some countries - including the United States. The Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, (Protocol I), 8 June 1977 states:

Article 47. Mercenaries

1. A mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant or a prisoner of war.

2. A mercenary is any person who:

(a) is especially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;

(b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;

(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party;

(d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict;

(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and

(f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces.

According to the Geneva Convention, all of the above criteria (a - f) must be met for a combatant to be described as a mercenary.






According to Geneva, a captured soldier must be treated as a lawful combatant and, therefore, as a protected person with prisoner-of-war status until facing a competent tribunal (GC III Art 5). That tribunal, using criteria in APGC77 or some equivalent domestic law, may decide if that soldier is a mercenary. At that juncture, the mercenary soldier becomes an unlawful combatant but still must be "treated with humanity and, in case of trial, shall not be deprived of the rights of fair and regular trial", being still covered by GC IV Art 5. The only possible exception to GC IV Art 5 is when he is a national of the authority imprisoning him, in which case he would not be a mercenary soldier as defined in APGC77 Art 47.d.

If, after a regular trial, a captured soldier is found to be a mercenary, then he can expect treatment as a common criminal and may face execution. As mercenary soldiers may not qualify as PoWs, they cannot expect repatriation at war's end. The best known post-World-War-II example of this was June 1976 when an Angolan court sentenced three Britons and an American to death, and nine other mercenaries to prison terms ranging from 16 to 30 years. The four mercenaries sentenced to death were shot by a firing squad on July 10, 1976.



Costas Georgiou (Greek: Κώστας Γιώργιου, alias "Colonel Callan") was a Greek Cypriot mercenary executed following the Luanda Trial for activities during the civil war phase of the Angolan War of Independence.



On 4 December 1989 the United Nations passed resolution 44/34, the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries. It entered into force on 20 October 2001 and is usually known as the UN Mercenary Convention. Article 1 contains the definition of a mercenary. Article 1.1 is similar to Article 47 of Protocol I, however Article 1.2 broadens the definition to include a non-national recruited to overthrow a "Government or otherwise undermining the constitutional order of a State; or Undermine the territorial integrity of a State;" and "Is motivated to take part therein essentially by the desire for significant private gain and is prompted by the promise or payment of material compensation..." — under Article 1.2 a person does not have to take a direct part in the hostilities in a planned coup d'état to be a mercenary.

Critics argue that the convention and APGC77 Art. 47 were directed to mercenary activities in post-colonial Africa and do not adequately address the use of private military companies (PMCs) by sovereign states.

The situation during the Iraq War and after the United Nations Security Council sanctioned hand-over of power to the Iraqi government shows the difficulty of defining a mercenary soldier. While the United States governed Iraq, no U.S. citizen working as an armed guard could be classified as a mercenary, because he was a national of a Party to the conflict (APGC77 Art 47.d).




The legal status of civilian contractors depends upon the nature of their work and their nationalities with respect to that of the combatants. If they have not "in fact, taken a direct part in the hostilities" (APGC77 Art 47.b), they are NOT mercenaries but civilians who have non-combat support roles and are entitled to protection under the Third Geneva Convention (GCIII 4.1.4). This includes armed civilians authorized to use deadly force in self-defense.


BET YOU DIDN'T KNOW THAT DEPARTMENT:

Contrary to widespread popular misconception, Private Military Companies and private security contractors ARE subject to the legal constraints of the
Uniformed Code of Military Justice:


New U.S. law on Private Military Companies:

According to the FY2007 Defense Budget Appropriation Bill, the Uniformed Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) has been amended to allow for prosecution of military contractors who are deployed in a "declared war or a contingency operation."

"SEC. 552. CLARIFICATION OF APPLICATION OF UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE DURING A TIME OF WAR. Paragraph (10) of section 802(a) of title 10, United States Code (article 2(a) of the UCMJ), is amended by striking 'war' and inserting 'declared war or a contingency operation'."

Previously, the code applied to "persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field" only during a war, which US courts interpreted to mean a war declared by Congress. No such declaration was made in the Iraq conflict. In 2006 Congress amended the code to apply to persons accompanying an armed force during a "declared war or contingency operation."




General Data on the Number of Private Security Contractor Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan

(Source: Operational Contract Support "State of the Union" May 2009; Office of the Deputy Under-Secretary of Defense, Logistics & Materiel Readiness)

o Private security contractors perform personal security, convoy security, and static security missions. Not all private security contractor personnel are armed.

o USCENTCOM reports, as of 10 May 2009 , the following distribution of private security contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan:

o There was a 23% increase (from 8,701 to 10,743) of armed DoD PSCs in Iraq compared to the 1st quarter FY 2009 census. This increase can be attributed to our improved ability to account for subcontractors who are providing security services.

o There was a 29% increase (from 3,184 to 4,111) of armed DoD PSCs in Afghanistan compared to the 1st quarter FY 2009 census. The increase correlates to the build up of forces in that AOR.

General Conditions Regarding Contracts and Contractor Personnel

The Combatant Commander has provided specific guidance on arming contractor personnel and private security contractors in the USCENTCOM AOR through a series of Fragmentary Orders (FRAGOs) and other authoritative guidance, including the following:

Private security contractor personnel are not authorized to participate in offensive operations and must comply with specific USCENTCOM Rules for the Use of Force (RUF). Under these RUF, private security contractor personnel are authorized to use deadly force only when necessary in: self-defense, defense of facilities / persons as specified in their contract; prevention of life-threatening acts directed against civilians; or defense of Coalition-approved property specified within their contract. The Multi-National Force - Iraq (MNF-I) issues to approved private security contractor personnel a weapons card authorizing them to carry a weapon. This weapons card also contains the guidance for the RUF and the contractor personnel’s signature acknowledging the difference between the RUF and the Rules of Engagement.




Private security contractor personnel in Iraq must be properly licensed to carry arms in accordance with host nation law and must receive USCENTCOM / Coalition Forces’ approval of their operations. Coalition Provisional Authority Order 17 (CPA 17), Status of the Coalition, Foreign Liaison Missions, Their Personnel and Contractors (June 23, 2003), is still in effect. It addresses Private Security Contractors operating in Iraq and requires the contractor’s understanding of and compliance with all applicable:

o U.S., host nation, and third country national laws;

o Treaties and international agreements;

o U.S. regulations, directives, instructions, policies; and

Orders, Standing Operating Procedures, and policies issued by the Combatant and / or Operational Commanders:

o MNF-I forces are authorized to stop, search, seize weapons, and detain civilians armed under MNF –I Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) 07-428 (Armed Contractors / DoD Civilians and PSCs), if MNF-I forces observe a RUF violation, exhibitions of criminal behavior, or conduct that threatens security.

o DoD contractor personnel armed by DoD authority must report any use of force, including the firing of a weapon. This requirement and the required information to be submitted are identified within the terms of the contract and MNF–I FRAGO, 07-428. MNF-I forces must report any use of force by a civilian armed under the requirements of this FRAGO to their chain of command.






To Be Continued . . . . . . S.L.


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